The Political Context.
The result of the general election of 2010 -a Coalition government consisting of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties -gave rise to a particularly problematic situation as regards the question of the future of the Human Rights Act. The Conservative Party manifesto had contained a pledge to 'replace the Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of Rights'. The Liberal Democrats however had stated in their manifesto that they would 'ensure that everyone has the same protections under the law by protecting the Human Rights Act'. After some delay, a compromise position was adopted, whereby a Commission was established in March 2011 with the mandate inter alia of investigating 'the creation of a UK Bill of Rights that incorporates and builds on (the UK's) obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, ensures that these rights continue to be enshrined in UK law, and protects and extends…liberties.' It is notable that, even from the outset, this process suffered from a remarkable amount of incoherency. Essentially, the primary reason for addressing the question of a UK Bill of Rights at that juncture was the Conservative Party's belief that the Human Rights Act should be replaced. However, the Commission's mandate was to investigate the creation of a UK Bill of Rights to incorporate and build upon the UK's obligations under the European Convention and ensure that these rights remain part of UK law. According to this mandate, proposing a weaker instrument than the Human Rights Act was not an option. Therefore, there was never any possibility that the Commission's deliberations could produce a solution to the perceived problem.
The Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights.
During the course of its deliberations, the Committee produced two consultation papers. On each occasion approximately a quarter of respondents supported a UK Bill of Rights; just under half opposed such a Bill; with the remainder being neither clearly for or against. 2 The majority of those who opposed a UK Bill of Rights did so on the basis that the UK already has a bill of rights, in the form of the Human Rights Act. Many of the respondents who shared this view were of the opinion that the Act is working well and that it is 'an effective and sophisticated piece of legislation '. 3 In particular, there was 'considerable suspicion among many respondents that the call for a UK Bill of Rights from some political parties and politicians (was) motivated by a desire to reduce existing human rights protection'. 4 In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, calls for a UK Bill 
Would a UK Bill of Rights improve on the Human Rights Act?
Two members of the Commission -Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws and Philippe Sands -were however of the view that the time was not ripe for the conclusion to be reached that a new UK Bill of Rights should be enacted. Their primary reason for disagreeing with the approach of the majority was the fact that the majority had failed to identify any actual shortcomings in the Human Rights Act or in its application by the judiciary. Essentially the problem which the majority of the Commission perceived to exist was not with the Act itself, but with the way in which it is viewed by certain sections of the public. Indeed, from a legal perspective, the Act is working in an Essentially, to expect that a human rights instrument will achieve symbolic status in a country with a constitutional history such as that of the UK is perhaps to be overly optimistic.
Another reason why the Human Rights Act has not achieved iconic status may be due to its own operative mechanisms. The American and South African bills of rights 11 New Zealand Bill of Rights Amendment Bill 2010 both accord the respective judiciaries the power to strike down legislation which is incompatible with the rights contained therein. It is not suggested that the Human Rights Act should be amended to allow the UK judges to do likewise. Indeed, affording the judiciary such a power would be seen as anathema to many in the political sphere, and as contrary to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which is the bedrock of the constitutional order of the UK. However, the fact that the US and South African judiciaries have the power to strike down legislation which is incompatible with human rights standards gives the respective bills of rights something of a dramatic flourish, which is significantly more likely to catch the imagination of the public than is the declaration of incompatibility mechanism found in section 4 of the Human Rights Act.
Of course, that is not to denigrate this mechanism in any way. Indeed, the respondents to the Commission's consultations were widely of the view that section 4 of the Human Rights Act is operating in a successful manner, and the majority of the Commission was of the opinion that a similar mechanism should be utilised in a UK Bill of Rights.
However, the very fact that this mechanism had to be created in order to address the difficulty of how to reconcile a human rights instrument with the constitutional context of the UK adds weight to the proposition that it may be immensely difficult for the Human Rights Act (or indeed any UK Bill of Rights) to achieve a status equivalent to that of the US or South African bills of rights.
However, the fact that the Human Rights Act has not achieved iconic status does not mean that it has insufficient support. It seems that levels of opposition to the Human consultations were in favour of a Bill of Rights does not lead one to believe that a Bill of Rights would engender any greater sense of 'ownership' than has the Human Rights Act.
The Commission itself stated in its report that there was a strong strand in response to our consultations that even if there were, and are, problems or perceived problems with the Human Rights Act, or its adjudication by the courts, these have largely been caused by a lack of public education, and could be addressed accordingly.
15
For example, the British Institute of Human Rights commented in its response to the consultation that, rather than reinventing the wheel with a Bill of Rights, we believe the Commission should focus on recommending the need for an appropriate and accessible programme for public education on human rights and the (Human Rights Act) to show that the law works and is working well.
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In addition, as regards the elements of the public among whom an 'ownership' problem is deemed to exist, it is arguable that negative attitudes may be linked to the concept of 'human rights', as opposed to the Human Rights Act specifically. A proportion of members of the public may well be of the opinion that 'human rights' create advantages for the 'undeserving' in society, such as terrorist suspects. The Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill.
In 2012 This provision sought to link the entitlement to rights to the exercise of responsibilities, and envisages situations in which courts may decide that a right should not be applied, essentially due to the conduct of the person seeking to rely on the right. It is however doubtful whether such a provision would ever receive sufficient support to be enacted,
given that the majority of respondents to the consultations carried out by the Bill of Rights Commission indicated that they were of the view that rights should not be linked to the exercise of responsibilities. It is also doubtful whether the courts would apply a somewhat vaguely drafted provision such as this in a manner as to prevent individuals from relying on rights, as such an approach would be contrary to internationally accepted human rights principles. No guidance was given on how the courts should take into account the conduct of the person seeking to assert the right, and it is difficult to imagine that there would be a great many cases in which the courts would hold that it would be unfair to apply a right. From a purely pragmatic perspective therefore, it is unlikely that such a provision would make any great difference to the outcomes of cases.
Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, linking the entitlement to rights with conduct in this manner strikes at the very heart of the foundations of human rights in a deeply troubling manner.
As in the Human Rights Act, section 3 of the Bill related to the interpretation of legislation by the courts. Section 3(1) stated that, 'When reading and giving effect to legislation in light of the UK rights, the words and sentences of legislation must be construed in accordance with their ordinary and natural meaning.' Section 3(2) provided that, 'Where the meaning of legislation arrived at in accordance with subsection (1) is ambiguous, it may be presumed that a possible meaning that is compatible with the UK rights was intended, unless the contrary intention appears.' The Bill therefore adopted a much more restrictive approach as to the interpretation of statutes in accordance with rights than does section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, which states that, 'So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.' A fairly liberal approach has been taken by the courts to section 3(1), with the seminal case on interpretation being that of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza. 22 However, under section 3(1) of the Bill, legislative provisions would have to be construed in accordance with their ordinary meaning, with the question of a possible rights-consistent interpretation only arising if there is ambiguity. Indeed, this is the approach that the UK courts currently take towards the provisions of international treaties that are not incorporated into domestic law. It seems somewhat odd that so-called 'UK rights' would not be afforded a higher status under the Bill. Section 4 of the Bill contains a declaration of incompatibility mechanism, which is very similar to that found in section 4 of the Human Rights Act. It is however likely that this mechanism would be used much more frequently by the courts under the Bill than is currently the case under the Human Rights Act, due to the extremely limited circumstances in which section 3(2) could be used. If a declaration of incompatibility is issued, it is up to Parliament to decide whether the legislation in question should be amended to make it compatible with rights, as opposed to the courts simply applying a rights-consistent interpretation using the interpretative 22 [2004] UKHL 30 obligation. Therefore, the Bill would decrease the role of the courts, relative to Parliament, as regards human rights issues.
Section 7(1) of the Bill stated that, 'It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which could not reasonably be regarded, in all the facts and circumstances of the case, as compatible with the UK rights.' This provision would raise the threshold for a finding of unlawfulness from that which is currently applied by the courts under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act, which states that, 'It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.' Indeed the reference to reasonableness brings to mind the Wednesbury 23 standard which is applied in judicial review cases which do not involve the Human Rights Act. Section 8 of the Bill provided a right of action for breach of the duty on public authorities which is broadly similar to that contained in section 7 of the Human Rights Act. Section 9(1) of the Bill stated that,
In relation to any act of a public authority which the court finds is unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate, unless the act was reasonable with regard to all the circumstances, including a reasonable understanding of primary or subordinate legislation applying to the public authority concerned.
The equivalent provision of the Human Rights Act is found in section 8(1), which states, 'In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate.' It is notable that the caveat placed on 23 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn. [1948] 1 KB 223 section 9(1) of the Bill appears to be superfluous. Section 9(1) would only come into operation if a court has already found that a public authority has acted in a way which could not reasonably be regarded as compatible with the UK rights, and that the public authority in question was not caused to act in such a manner by provisions of primary or subordinate legislation. 24 It would seem peculiar if the court then decided that the actions of the public authority were in fact reasonable for the purposes of section 9(1).
Section 11 of the Bill contained a power for Ministers of the Crown to take remedial action in respect of legislation declared under section 4 to be incompatible with UK rights. This mechanism is broadly similar to that found in section 10 of the Human Rights Act. Sections 13 and 14 of the Bill contained particular provisions relating to freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience and religion which are almost identical to those found in sections 12 and 13 of the Human Rights Act. Section 15 of the Bill would place an obligation on a Minister of the Crown who is introducing legislation to make either a statement that the provisions of the legislation are compatible with the UK rights, or a statement that the government nevertheless wishes to proceed with the legislation in the event of incompatibility. This procedure is identical to that of the making of statements of compatibility with the Convention rights under section 19 of the Human Rights Act.
The rights and responsibilities themselves were found in Schedule 1 to the Bill.
The rights listed were heavily based on those found in the European Convention, and 24 Section 7(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill 2013 indeed the wording used was for the large part identical to that of the Convention rights.
The differences between the rights in the Bill and the Convention rights tended to be related to issues which have been discussed by the media in the UK in recent times. 
Conclusion.
In conclusion therefore, it is highly probable that the Human Rights Act will continue in its present form, at least for the foreseeable future. It has been stated by the Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Government's official position is that it remains committed to the rights contained in the European Convention and to ensuring that those rights remain enshrined in UK law, there are sections of the Conservative Party which are strongly opposed to the continued incorporation of the Convention rights. The strength of this opposition may be seen in the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill. However, the key point is that the cause of the rules which are perceived as problematic is not the Human Rights Act, but rather the case law of the European Court, which would be binding on the UK regardless of the existence of the Act. If the objection is to the decisions of the Court in cases such as Chahal and Hirst, the replacement of the Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of Rights will never provide a solution.
